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I 
Dating back to the revolutionary era, France and the United States 
have vied, sometimes directly, in a longstanding contest for leadership 
status in the area of human rights. Where gay marriage is concerned, 
however, it would be more accurate to describe both nations as followers 
rather than leaders. In late April 2013, about twelve years after the 
Netherlands became the world’s first nation to legalize same-sex marriage,1 
and on the heels of large and passionate protests by social conservatives, 
France became the fourteenth such country, eliminating the Civil Code’s 
gender-specific language barring equal marriage.2 Not to be outdone, the 
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 1. Dutch Legislators Approve Full Marriage Rights for Gays, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2000), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/09/13/world/dutch-legislators-approve-full-marriage-rights-for-
gays.html?scp=2&sq=Norway+Gay+Marriages&st=nyt. 
 2. See Steven Erlanger, Hollande Signs French Gay Marriage Law, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/19/world/europe/hollande-signs-french-gay-marriage-
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United States, acting through judicial rather than legislative channels, 
followed suit in June 2013 with United States v. Windsor, striking down the 
Federal Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”).3 
It is difficult to tell whether this state of affairs reflects a fraying of the 
Atlantic revolutionary tradition or is, instead, the very measure of that 
tradition’s influence. Comparisons between France and the United States in 
this area of the law are, moreover, complicated to draw for several 
reasons.4 For one, the American human rights tradition has always drawn 
on state and local in addition to federal energy, and where gay marriage has 
progressed in the United States, it has been due largely to initiatives at 
these subnational levels. Second, while it is true that, as of this writing in 
mid-February 2015, the United States guarantees no national “right to gay 
marriage,” the American status quo is especially fluid at the moment. 
On January 16, 2015, the Supreme Court agreed to decide whether a 
state must allow same-sex couples to marry.5 It is possible to read Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion in Windsor, particularly the portion that discusses the 
federalist commitment of marriage law to the states,6 as leaving room for 
him to uphold state bans on same-sex marriage.7 But the many references 
to dignity, respect, equality, and liberty in that opinion suggest a different 
commitment, one more in keeping with the precedents earlier handed down 
by the authors of Lawrence v. Texas,8 Romer v. Evans,9 and other landmark 
due process and gay rights cases. Moreover, the precedent set by Loving v. 
Virginia (striking down a state ban on interracial marriage),10 combined 
 
law.html?_r=0. 
 3. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2680 (2013). 
 4. For an illuminating, early comparison of the French and American debates over same-sex 
marriage, see generally Eric Fassin, Same Sex, Different Politics: “Gay Marriage” Debates in France 
and the United States, 13 PUB. CULTURE 215 (2001). 
 5. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court to Decide Marriage Rights for Gay Couples Nationwide, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 16, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/17/us/supreme-court-to-decide-whether-gays-
nationwide-can-marry.html?ref=topic. 
 6. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692–93. 
 7. By contrast, I think Justice Scalia has the better of the argument with Chief Justice Roberts’ 
separate dissenting opinion, when Justice Scalia says that the awfully abrupt and awkward final line of 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion—“This opinion and its holding are confined to those [preexisting] lawful 
[same-sex] marriages,” id at 2696,—portends little about how Justice Kennedy will come down on the 
state law issue. Id. at 2709 (Scalia, J., dissenting). For Chief Justice Roberts’s take, see id. at 2696–97 
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 8. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 9. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 10. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967). 
GHACHEM_ACCOMMODATING EMPIRE [DRAFT] 88 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) 
2015] ACCOMODATING EMPIRE 103 
with the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (“LGBT”) movement’s 
increasingly successful framing of sexual orientation discrimination as a 
variation on race discrimination, justify a certain optimism about the 
direction in which we are headed. 
When nationwide gay marriage comes to the United States, the French 
and American paths will have converged to this extent. As in the 
revolutionary era, the institution of republican marriage will have served 
the role of making full citizens out of previously disenfranchised persons, 
with all of the advantages and disadvantages that come from relying on 
marriage to perform this essential function.11 In the meantime, we are faced 
with some clear differences in the two nations’ traditions of separation of 
powers, judicial review, federalism, and equality. Such differences help to 
explain why France and the United States have followed (and continue to 
follow) different institutional, procedural, and doctrinal paths to the 
common end of legalization. A subordination of judicial to legislative 
power in France dating back to the late eighteenth century, for example, 
helps to account for why the French Constitutional Council declined an 
opportunity in 2010 to mandate marriage equality as a matter of 
constitutional law. And an American federalist tradition with roots in the 
chartered colonial companies of the seventeenth century12 helps us to 
understand why the states (especially, but not exclusively, Massachusetts13) 
rather than federal authorities have been the drivers of change in America. 
This essay relates a different story at work, one that can help us to 
navigate a large and complex task of comparative legal analysis while 
gesturing at both the differences and the similarities. It is a story that 
speaks powerfully to the relationship between religious accommodation 
and antidiscrimination law that is the theme of this symposium. But it does 
so not from the vantage point of the familiar legal doctrines just mentioned 
or of other, less specifically legal factors, such as the mobilization of 
 
 11. Cf. JANET POLASKY, REVOLUTIONS WITHOUT BORDERS: THE CALL TO LIBERTY IN THE 
ATLANTIC WORLD 231 (2014) (“French revolutionaries assigned republican marriage the task of 
transforming French citizens.”). On the disadvantages of relying on marriage as a vehicle for the 
liberation of the LGBT community, see Katherine M. Franke, Marriage is a Mixed Blessing, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 23, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/24/opinion/24franke.html. 
 12. JACK P. GREENE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 9–10 
(2011); JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 163–64 (1996); Philip J. Stern, Trading Companies, in THE PRINCETON COMPANION TO 
ATLANTIC HISTORY 452–455 (Joseph C. Miller, 3d., 2015). 
 13. Kathleen Burge, SJC: Gay Marriage Legal in Mass.: Court Gives the State Six Months to 
Comply With Ruling, BOS. GLOBE (Nov. 18, 2003), 
http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2003/11/18/sjc_gay_marriage_legal_in_mass
. 
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LGBT communities in postwar France and America. Instead of due 
process, equality, fundamental rights, or LGBT mobilization, the history at 
issue is one of decolonization, immigration, and religious pluralism, above 
all Christian-Muslim pluralism. Although both France and the United 
States are nations of immigrants, only in France has the very close nexus 
between empire and the migration of peoples left a distinctive, explicit, and 
little-noticed mark on the contemporary law of gay marriage. 
Understanding that history invites us to decenter, for a moment, the 
existing narratives about marriage equality and its intersection with 
constitutionalism. 
Mark Mazower has suggested that French debates in 2013 over the 
legalization of same-sex marriage were part and parcel of a longer 
“struggle to come to terms with [France’s] dwindling global stature.”14 The 
observation rings true, but what exactly is the connection between the two 
phenomena? Focusing on the recognition of same-sex marriages between 
nationals and foreigners in the United States and France, this essay looks 
beneath the postcolonial veil covering gay marriage to consider what the 
histories of empire, religion, and immigration have to do with it. Under the 
Windsor decision and its implementation by the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, the American federal government now appears to be 
committed to equal treatment of heterosexual and same-sex marriages 
between American and foreign nationals.15 By contrast, the National 
Assembly’s 2013 reform of the French Civil Code introduced a curiously 
anachronistic set of conflict of laws provisions that seems to hearken back 
unmistakably to the French colonial experience.16 The provisions in 
question tie a person’s eligibility for marriage to her “personal law,” and 
then qualify that apparent limitation by permitting French law to override 
foreign law in the case of a marriage between French and non-French 
nationals.17 While same-sex marriage is the context, the provisions are 
worded entirely in the abstract. A subsequent circular from the Ministry of 
 
 14. Mark Mazower, France’s Struggle is Against Much More Than Gay Marriage, FIN. TIMES 
(May 29, 2013, 4:39 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2d964a70-c7a3-11e2-9c52-00144feab7de.html. 
 15. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Statement by Secretary of Homeland 
Security Janet Napolitano on the Supreme Court Ruling on the Defense of Marriage Act, (June 26, 
2013), available at http://www.dhs.gov/news/2013/06/26/statement-secretary-homeland-security-janet-
napolitano-supreme-court-ruling-defense (“[W]e will implement today’s decision so that all married 
couples will be treated equally and fairly in the administration of our immigration laws.”). 
 16. These and nearly all other French legal texts referenced in this article can be accessed via 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr. 
 17. See infra Part II. 
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Justice, however, makes clear that France’s treaty commitments with its 
former North African and Indochinese territories, among other nations, bar 
French nationals and the citizens of these once colonized territories from 
qualifying for same-sex marriage in France.18 
I consider three contexts for this state of affairs, each raising a related 
challenge to the definition and jurisdiction of the nation-state: empire, 
immigration, and religion. The intersection between these contexts 
highlights just how much is obscured by purely moral, doctrinal, or 
institutional comparisons of the French and American paths to marriage 
equality, including a comparison that would emphasize the role of French 
laïcité (which we can imperfectly translate as “secularism”). For what the 
postcolonial vantage point reveals is a kind of religious exemption at work 
in what amounts to a recognition of the lingering (either Catholic or 
Muslim) sacramental content of marriage itself, whether straight or gay. 
I conclude with a set of observations about the new American same-
sex marriage regime in light of the French comparison. The notion of 
religious exemptions from civil laws is a very American thing and will 
become even more so now that Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. is 
decided.19 On the other hand, the absence of a national matrimonial regime 
means, by definition, that American same-sex marriage law has no parallel 
to the French conflicts rules. American law seems to presume, at least in 
the aftermath of Windsor, that immigrants to the United States will be able 
to partake of the benefits of American law irrespective of the former 
colonial relationships in which their nations of origin happen to be 
entangled. That presumption, in turn, can itself be seen as an act of a 
specifically American imperial legal imagination. It is a vision of empire 
unencumbered by the particular territorial commitments, fractures, and 
anxieties that seem to animate the French regime. But it is an imperial 
vision nonetheless, and it has broad implications for our current battles 
over gay marriage and immigration reform. On the one hand, the American 
vision of empire allows both national and state governments to create 
different kinds of foreigners in law. Consistent with this tradition, the key 
remaining fronts in the ongoing battle over the legalization of same-sex 
marriage involve the borders—some geographical and external, others legal 
 
 18. MINISTERE DE LA JUSTICE, BULL: NOR: JUSC1312445C, CIRCULAIRE DU 29 MAI 2013    
 R    T T          LOI OUVRANT LE MARIAGE AUX COUPLES DE PERSONNES DE MEME SEXE 
(DISPOSITIONS DU CODE CIVIL), *4–5 [hereinafter CIRCULAR OF MAY 29, 2013]. 
 19. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014) (holding that closely-
held corporations cannot be required to provide contraceptive coverage if the corporations’ owners have 
religious objections to the contraception). 
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and internal—between state and federal authority. On the other hand, there 
are signs that LGBT activism and the struggle for same-sex marriage have 
helped inspire a powerful movement for recognition of the rights of illegal 
aliens that may lead in the direction of progressive immigration reform in 
America. 
II 
For advocates of the same-sex marriage movement, the French 
method of legalizing same-sex marriage has an appealing simplicity and 
totality to it. The key change was to Article 143 of the Civil Code, first 
promulgated under Napoleon in 1804 as the culmination of the 
revolutionary-era movements to codify the civil laws of France. The new 
article, adopted by the National Assembly on May 17, 2013, reads as 
follows: “Marriage is contracted by two persons of different or the same 
sex.”20 End of story. Contrast that concise provision with the current legal 
status of American same-sex marriage (as of mid-February 2015): available 
in thirty-six states and the District of Columbia, prohibited in fourteen 
states, and no federal rule yet on the constitutionality of a state ban on gay 
marriage.
21
 This is to say nothing of the various jurisdictional problems 
stemming from that lack of uniformity, such as the status of a couple 
married in a state that permits gay marriage but residing in a state that does 
not. Windsor removed these jurisdictional quandaries at the level of federal 
recognition of same-sex marriages, but they remain at the level at which 
they are most conspicuous: the state level, where geographical residency 
(and therefore state and local fiscal rules, among others) takes on concrete 
meaning. State control over marriage law has a very long history in the 
United States, as Justice Kennedy ponderously (and not quite convincingly) 
explains in Windsor.22 That control gives the federal authorities a limited, 
but still important, role in supervising whether state rules of admission to 
the covenant of marriage comport with national legal norms. 
 
 20. CODE CIVIL [C.CIV] art. 143. (Fr.). 
 21. Erik Eckholm, Court Upholds Marriage Ban in Four States, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/07/us/appeals-court-upholds-same-sex-marriage-ban.html?ref=us. 
Depending on the outcome of a contest between state and federal judges in Alabama that is still 
unfolding as of this writing, the number of permissive states may soon be thirty-seven. See Richard 




 22. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689–93 (2013). 
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Supervision of this kind is also, in a sense, what the new French 
conflicts rules are about: determining in what circumstances the French 
national government should or should not override the restrictions on gay 
marriage that foreign governments may seek to impose on their citizens. 
But France is not the only former European imperial power to legalize 
same-sex marriage, and there is nothing inevitable about the particular rules 
it has adopted to govern marriages between citizens and immigrants. 
Belgium, for example, which legalized gay marriage in 2003,23 requires 
only that one of the spouses be a Belgian citizen or a resident of Belgium 
for at least three months.24 
The French solution to this shared dilemma (if that is what it is) was 
twofold. First, the National Assembly introduced what was, for purposes of 
marriage law, a novel provision concerning the so-called conditions de fond 
(substantive conditions) of marriage, that is, the rules, unrelated to sexual 
orientation, that govern eligibility for marriage generally: “The requisite 
qualities and conditions for being able to contract marriage are regulated, 
for each spouse, by his personal law.”25 Nothing could be more foreign to 
the French revolutionary concept of a civil code. That concept was 
predicated in significant measure on the idea that, in areas such as family 
law and private contractual relations that came indisputably under the 
rubric of the initial 1804 Code, the many person-specific rules, exemptions, 
and privileges of Old Regime law were supposed to fade away. In the 
words of one French revolutionary deputy, the Code was a compilation in 
which, “without distinction of classes or persons, the law addressed itself to 
all.”26 Under the Napoleonic government, for example, Jews were 
“emancipated” on condition that they abandon their distinctive rituals. In 
the language of the time, anything else would risk continuation of their 
status as “a ‘nation within a nation,’ a ‘state within a state.’”27 
At once profoundly retrogressive and radically innovative in terms of 
this comparison between pre- and postrevolutionary French law, the new 
rule defining the substantive conditions of marriage sounds abstract 
 
 23. Gareth Harding, Belgium Legalizes Gay Marriage, UPI (Jan. 31, 2003), 
http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2003/01/31/Belgium-legalizes-gay-
marriage/UPI-46741044012415. 
 24. Getting Married, PORTAL BELGIUM.BE, 
http://www.belgium.be/en/family/becoming_a_belgian_citizen_by_marriage (last visited Jan. 10, 
2015). 
 25. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 202-1 (Fr.). 
 26. JEAN-LOUIS HALPÉRIN,  ’IMPOSSIBLE CODE CIVIL 277 (1992). 
 27. ARNOLD M. EISEN, RETHINKING MODERN JUDAISM: RITUAL, COMMANDMENT, COMMUNITY 
39-40 (1998). 
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enough. But it is accompanied by a companion provision, also new to the 
Civil Code, that makes clear same-sex marriage is the modus operandi of 
the entire scheme: however, “[t]wo persons of the same sex may contract 
marriage when, for at least one of them, their personal law or the law of the 
State in which they have their domicile or residence permits it.”28 
A very curious combination of provisions this is. One way of trying to 
make sense of them is to ask, quite simply, to whom these provisions are 
meant to apply. It turns out that the answer to this question is not so simple. 
The requirement that at least one partner in a same-sex marriage have a 
“domicile or residence” in France has the effect of denying sans papiers 
(“illegal” immigrants or aliens) the benefits of a legally recognized gay 
marriage. That seems true enough at the level of statutory law, though 
French case law holds otherwise, on the grounds that marriage is a 
“fundamental right.”29 It is also apparent that Article 202-1 seeks to protect 
the right of French nationals to enter into same-sex marriages with the 
citizens of countries that prohibit same-sex marriage. Such couples who 
live abroad, in the prohibitive country, have the option of seeking to 
formalize their French marriage before French diplomatic and consular 
authorities in that country. Where that is not possible, the Civil Code 
permits these couples to have their marriage formalized by civil authorities 
in the French national’s hometown in France.30 
But what about same-sex couples of mixed nationality residing in 
France? As of May 29, 2013, such couples have been divided into two 
camps: those where one of the partners is the national of a country with 
which France has a bilateral treaty implicating marriage, and all others. In a 
circular of that date, the Ministry of Justice announced that the legalization 
of same-sex marriage “cannot however apply for the ressortissants of 
countries to which France is tied by bilateral agreements that envision that 
personal law defines the substantive conditions of marriage.”31 Because of 
the superiority of international treaty law over domestic statutory law, the 
treaties prohibit the French government from “discarding” the personal law 
of the “ressortissants” of such countries.32 
 
 28. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 202-1 (Fr.). 
 29.  For a recent order discussing marriage as a fundamental freedom, see CE, July 9, 2014, Rec. 
Lebon 382145. 
 30. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 171-9 (Fr). This provision was also added by the May 17, 2013 
legislation legalizing same-sex marriage in France. 
 31. CIRCULAR OF MAY 29, 2013, supra note 18, at *4. 
 32. Id. 
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Dominated by the vocabulary of international private law, the circular 
fits into a long history of French efforts at the transnational regulation of 
sexuality that scholars such as Judith Surkis have uncovered.33 The range of 
regulatory issues raised by such efforts is perhaps greater than meets the 
eye and begins at the level of definition. Who is a “ressortissant,” for 
example? The answer seems to overlap largely with nationality, but what 
about dual nationals (of which there are many)? Or persons who are in the 
process of acquiring French or other nationality on grounds other than 
marriage? Does the (foreign) personal law of these individuals get 
“discarded” also? And what exactly does it mean to “discard” someone’s 
“personal law”? For that matter, what exactly is the category of “personal 
law” supposed to mean if it does not mean the law of the nation of which 
one is a citizen—in which case why distinguish between the collective 
(national) and the individual (personal)?34 
III 
These questions are best handled inductively, reasoning upwards from 
the specific treaties in question. But their significance can be appreciated, 
in the first instance, by another contrast with the American situation. 
Windsor and its aftermath are best compared not to the 2013 reforms of the 
French Civil Code—by that standard the United States still lags behind—
but to the Ministry of Justice circular of May 29, 2013 clarifying the scope 
of same-sex marriage in today’s globalized France. It is true that the 
Supreme Court struck down only section three of DOMA, which had 
excluded same-sex partners from the definition of “spouse” as that term is 
used in federal statutes.35 Section two, which relieves states of the 
obligation to recognize one another’s same-sex marriages, remains good 
law, though it has been challenged since Windsor.36 We still lack clarity, in 
other words, about how American law, state and federal, will handle the 
 
 33. See Judith Surkis, Sex, Sovereignty, and Transnational Intimacies, 115 AM. HIST. REV. 1089, 
1096 (2010) (“Transnational histories, alongside postcolonial ones, provide one powerful way to 
unsettle the reified conceptions of national sexual cultures on which contemporary political discussions, 
most notably regarding  slam and immigration, so often insist.”); Judith Surkis, Hymenal Politics: 
Marriage, Secularism, and French Sovereignty, 22 PUB. CULTURE 531, 551–54 (2010) [hereinafter 
Hymenal Politics] (discussing scholarship that focuses on challenges posed on French legal and social 
norms by transnational marriages). 
 34. 1 DOMINIQUE BUREAU & HORATIA MUIR WATT, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 17–20 
(2007). For an introduction to the doctrines and rules of private international law from a French 
perspective, see id. at 17–67. 
 35. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694–96 (2013). 
 36. Id. at 2682–83. Section two of DOMA has been successfully challenged in at least one 
federal court thus far. William Baude, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage after Windsor, 8 
N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 150, 151, 158–60 (2013). 
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full range of interstate comity and conflict of laws issues related to same-
sex marriage. Although limited to same-sex marriages validly contracted in 
states that already permit it, the Court’s invalidation of section three has 
nonetheless produced a major new area of uniformity into the law of gay 
marriage, one that contrasts sharply with the particularistic treatment of 
mixed couples in France. 
Within hours of the Windsor decision, the Obama Administration 
implemented its reform of federal immigration policy to comply with 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion. Deportation proceedings, already suspended, 
were now vacated in the federal courts, and the way was cleared for the 
same-sex partners of American citizens to apply for permanent resident 
status. (It should be remembered that this progress has come only after a 
decades-long history, ending as recently as the 1980s, during which federal 
immigration law was interpreted to exclude homosexuals from entering the 
country on the grounds that they suffered from a “psychopathic 
personality.”)37 Using the unusual method of e-mail, the U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration Services began notifying the attorneys of mixed 
nationality, same-sex couples that their clients’ visa applications had been 
approved. All of a sudden, the barriers that sexual orientation 
discrimination had long posed to the lives of mixed nationality, same-sex 
couples in the United States were lifted.38 
Notice what has not happened in the aftermath of Windsor: the 
Department of State has not issued an advisory warning Americans that 
certain of their same-sex marriages may not be valid in light of U.S. 
international legal commitments. Given the lack of a national law of 
marriage, once DOMA’s section three was suspended, the federal 
government’s role with respect to foreigners and immigrants was confined 
to the entry process itself.39 It is theoretically possible that American 
 
 37. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS, BACKLASH, AND THE 
STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 15, 24–25, 34 (2013). 
 38. Julia Preston, For Gay Immigrants, Marriage Ruling Brings Relief and a Path to a Green 
Card, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/28/us/politics/for-gay-
immigrants-marriage-ruling-brings-relief-and-a-path-to-a-green-card.html?_r=0; Julia Preston, Gay 
Married Man in Florida is Approved for Green Card, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/01/us/gay-married-man-in-florida-is-approved-for-green-card.html. 
 39. This said, there is one respect in which American law at the intersection of gay marriage, 
immigration, and foreign status seems more restrictive than French law. Immigrants to the United States 
who get married overseas in a country where gay marriage is banned are not eligible for the federal 
benefits that would otherwise flow from Windsor. In certain circumstances, French law permits such 
consular marriages to be ratified (and thus recognized) in France. 
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nationals tend not to enter into same-sex relationships with the nationals of 
countries that prohibit gay marriage, or that they do so at a far lower rate 
than the citizens of France. Even if so, the absence of international private 
law obstacles to mixed nationality, same-sex marriages in the United States 
seems to involve a less hypothetical, more historical explanation: in France, 
the histories of immigration and empire have intersected to a far greater 
extent than elsewhere. 
IV 
Let us now consider the specific treaties at issue in the Ministry of 
Justice circular of May 29, 2013. A good part of the answer to the 
interpretive questions raised by these treaties lies simply in the identity of 
the counterparties themselves. The circular lists the countries at issue in a 
seemingly random order, the effect of which is to obscure the politics and 
the history behind the current availability of same-sex marriage in France.40 
The countries in question (followed by the year of their treaty agreements 
with France) are the former French North African colony and protectorates 
of Algeria (1962), Tunisia (1957), and Morocco (1981), the former French 
Indochinese territories of Cambodia and Laos (1953), the former Yugoslav 
republics (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, Kosovo, and 
Slovenia) (1971), and Poland (1967). The treaties do not implicate the 
entirety of the former French empire. Vietnam, for example, is absent from 
the Indochinese category, and the former French colonial presence in India, 
Senegal, and Madagascar has managed not to leave its trace where the law 
of marriage is concerned. But the seemingly arbitrary nature of this list is 
compounded by an even more conspicuous absence: the list excludes any 
nation that prohibits same-sex marriage (or even criminalizes same-sex 
conduct) but happens not to have a bilateral treaty with France on the law 
of persons. The May 29, 2013 circular requires that the ressortissants of 
these countries—the circular provides a list ranging from Afghanistan at 
one end of the alphabet to Togo and Tunisia at the other—be warned at 
their town hall marriage ceremony that their marriage may not be 
recognized abroad.41 But the nationals of these countries, which include 
former French territories such as Maurice, Senegal, and Syria, can still 
proceed to marry a same-sex French citizen in France. 
It is not, therefore, strictly speaking true that the prohibitive treaties 
align along postimperial lines. Moreover, neither Poland nor the former 
 
 40. CIRCULAR OF MAY 29, 2013, supra note 18, at *4–5. 
 41. Id. at *6. See also Groupe d’information et de soutien des immigrées (G  T ), Le mariage 
des étrangers, CAHIERS JURIDIQUE, April 2014, at 7. 
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Yugoslav republics are former colonies of France, yet they are included in 
the list of countries whose ressortissants may not qualify for French same-
sex marriage. But if the immigration-empire nexus does not provide an 
altogether tidy explanation, it is also hard to dismiss. Consider a more 
textual way of categorizing the treaties. As a matter of legal intent and 
(arguably) effect, they fall into two categories, which I will label 
symmetrical and asymmetrical. The first category comprises those treaties 
that prohibit discarding the national (and therefore “personal”) law of 
ressortissants of either of the signatory countries—France or the foreign 
nation. The asymmetrical category compromises those treaties that 
specifically and exclusively guarantee the application of French law to 
French nationals living (extraterritorially, as it were) in the other country. 
The question arises, which treaties (with which nations) fall into each 
category? 
Answer: the asymmetrical treaties are all agreements with former 
French territories. (For this reason, among others, the asymmetrical treaties 
hearken back to the so-called capitulations treaties of the nineteenth-
century European empires in North Africa, which aimed to protect 
Christian subjects from judgment at the hands of Islamic legal systems.)42 
The symmetrical treaties, by contrast, involve the miscellaneous others: 
Poland, the former Yugoslav republics, and Morocco—the only former 
French territory that has a symmetrical accord with Paris.43 
“Miscellaneous,” however, is not quite the right word for this latter group, 
for the symmetrical treaties all involve nations that have seen larger 
numbers of citizens emigrate to France. This is true of Poles beginning in 
the 1830s and, with renewed force, after the First World War.45 And it is 
 
 42. MARY DEWHURST LEWIS, DIVIDED RULE: SOVEREIGNTY AND EMPIRE IN FRENCH TUNISIA, 
1881–1938, at 31 (2014). 
 43. Morocco formally became a French protectorate in 1912 with the signing of the Fez 
Convention. France gradually extended its control over the territory during the 1920s and held it until 
1956, when Morocco achieved its independence. EUGENE ROGAN, THE ARABS: A HISTORY 135, 296; 
(2009); ALBERT HOURANI, A HISTORY OF THE ARAB PEOPLES 322 (1991). Morocco’s inclusion in the 
terms of the 2013 circular has a clear post-colonial dimension. But, as Judith Surkis has explained to 
me, the symmetrical character of Morocco’s treaty with France should be understood in relation to the 
1975 passage of "no fault" divorce in France and ensuing conflict of law questions in custody disputes. 
Similar bilateral conventions were signed with Egypt and Tunisia. Surkis is currently working on the 
history of the 1981 French-Moroccan treaty. Facebook message from Judith Surkis, Assoc. Professor, 
Rutgers Univ., to author (Feb. 20, 2015) (on file with author). 
 45.  See Janine Ponty, La France, destination privilégiée des migrations venues des territoires de 
la Pologne aux XIXe et XXe siècles, in POLONIA: DES POLONAIS EN FRANCE DE 1830 A NOS JOURS 7, 7–9 
(Janine Ponty ed., 2011). 
GHACHEM_ACCOMMODATING EMPIRE [DRAFT] 88 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) 
2015] ACCOMODATING EMPIRE 113 
true also of the former Yugoslavia, which saw larger numbers of workers 
immigrate to France between the 1890s and the 1960s.46 Again, empire and 
migration are far from mutually exclusive phenomena. The difference is 
that the asymmetrical treaties, historically speaking, all addressed the 
reverse situation: not the emigration of foreigners to France, but of French 
nationals to the colonies (and, albeit to a lesser extent, the post-colonies). 
It was one of the great anxieties of decolonization that the “loss” of 
French sovereignty would occasion conflicts of law in a host of subject 
areas, from criminal justice to family law to the disciplining of French 
military forces. This anxiety provided the context and rationale for the 
asymmetrical treaties. In the 1950s, the France empire in Indochina (part of 
the “French Union” that comprised Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam in 
addition to France’s other colonies) began to give way to an increasingly 
significant American presence in Vietnam, one great power replacing 
another in an area of the world that would prove so critical to postwar 
American history. The formal transfer of French sovereignty to royal 
authorities in the three Indochinese states was effectuated in a set of 
agreements dating to 1953. The French-Cambodia agreement is illustrative. 
On August 29, 1953, the French high commissioner for Cambodia wrote to 
the Cambodian prime minister requesting him to “specify how the Royal 
Government intends to resolve the conflicts of law that will arise before 
Cambodian national jurisdictions following the transfer of judicial 
competence to the Royal Government as well as problems related to the 
personal status of litigants emanating [ressortissant] from the French 
Union.”47 (The use of the term “French Union” here signifies that the 
ressortissants in question could hail from any part of the French empire and 
not just the metropole.) 
The Cambodian prime minister responded the same day with a letter 
assuring the French authorities that Cambodia “intends to apply the rules of 
private international law to resolve the conflicts of laws that might arise 
 
 46. GERARD NOIRIEL, THE FRENCH MELTING POT: IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, AND NATIONAL 
IDENTITY 102–03, 140 (Geoffroy de Laforcade trans., 1996). For a study of conflicts over the rights of 
immigrant workers in post-WWI France, see generally MARY DEWHURST LEWIS, THE BOUNDARIES OF 
THE REPUBLIC: MIGRANT RIGHTS AND THE LIMITS OF UNIVERSALISM IN FRANCE, 1918-1940 (2007). 
 47. Loi 59-593 du 22 avril 1959 portant publication des accords entre la France et le Cambodge 
des 29 août et 9 septembre 1953, des accords entre in France et le Viet-Nam des 16 septembre 1954 et 
10 août 1955, de l‘accord entre la France et le  aos du 22 octobre 1953 [ aw 59-593 of April 22, 1959 
adopting the declaration of agreements between France and Cambodia of August 29 and September 9, 
1953, and the agreements between France and Vietnam of September 16, 1954 and August 10, 1955, 
and the agreement between France and Laos of October 22, 1953], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA 
REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.][OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], May 3, 1959, p.4758. 
GHACHEM_ACCOMMODATING EMPIRE [DRAFT] 88 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) 
114 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:--- 
 
before Cambodian jurisdictions. The personal status of ressortissants of the 
French Union will be determined, following the rules of international 
private law, by their national law.”48 
Missing from this diplomatic and legal language are the passions and 
struggles of the Indochinese decolonization movement, which the 
Americans would soon inherit from their French counterparts. Not so easy 
to overlook are the upheavals that led to and coincided with French 
decolonization in Algeria. After a long and extremely violent war that 
involved distressingly frequent recourse to torture and terrorism on both 
sides, representatives of the French government and the Algerian National 
Liberation Front (“FLN”) met in Évian-les-Bains, in the southeastern Alps 
region of France. There, they concluded a ninety-three-page set of highly 
detailed agreements that would lead, following an April 1962 referendum 
in which only the citizens of mainland France participated, to President 
Charles de Gaulle’s recognition of Algerian independence in July.49 Many 
of the provisions of the Evian Accords, not surprisingly, spoke to the same 
anxieties about postcolonial conflicts of laws that animated the French 
Indochinese agreements. There was one critical difference, however, and it 
involved an issue deeply rooted in the complexities of French colonialism 
in North Africa: religion. 
Indeed, the history of France’s empire in the Maghreb reveals the 
extremely close connection between the concept of “personal law,” on the 
one hand, and relations between the Abrahamic religions of Christianity, 
Islam, and Judaism, on the other. The maintenance of distinct legal regimes 
and jurisdictions for adherents of each respective faith was, in a sense, the 
very warp and woof of French colonialism.50 That history is a complicated 
one and lies beyond the scope of this essay, but the broad contours of the 
story can be briefly sketched. On the one hand, Algeria was, from 1848 
onwards, a “department” of France and thus akin to a domestic territory, 
 
 48. Id. Given the reference to the “French Union” in this passage, the phrase “national law” 
should be understood to mean French law for ressortissants emanating from the metropole and 
(presumably) local law for persons hailing from other parts of the French empire. 
 49. Echange de lettres et déclarations adoptées le 19 mars 1962 à l’issue des pourparlers d’Evian, 
constituant un accord entre la France et l’ lgerie [Exchange of Letters and Declarations Adopted on 19 
March 1962 at the Close of the Evian Talks, Constituting an Agreement between France and Algeria], 
Mar. 19, 1962, Fr.-Alg., 1964 RECUEIL DES TRAITÉS, No. 7395 [hereinafter Evian Accords]. 
 50. An important exception was that, under the Crémieux decree of 1870, the “indigenous 
 sraelites” (Jews) of French  lgeria were declared to be French citizens. TODD SHEPARD, THE 
INVENTION OF DECOLONIZATION: THE ALGERIAN WAR AND THE REMAKING OF FRANCE xiii (2006). 
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and a Senatus-Consulte of July 1865 deemed the “indigenous [male] 
Muslims” of Algeria to be French subjects eligible to become French 
citizens only if they renounced their allegiance to Islamic personal law.51 
But the administration of day-to-day legal life in the French North African 
colonies was structured around mutually exclusive jurisdictions specific to 
the faith of a given subject: thus, French tribunals for French (Christian) 
subjects, Jewish law for the Jewish community (until the 1870 Crémieux 
decree, and if not protected as French subjects in places like Tunisia and 
Morocco), and Muslim courts for the Arab and Berber Muslim 
population.52 
Mary Lewis has shown how, in the case of neighboring Tunisia—
conquered by French military forces in 1881 on the grounds that the 
Ottoman ruler of Tunis was failing to suppress the incursions of rogue 
tribes across the Algerian-Tunisian border53—the lines between these 
categories were frequently crossed and manipulated.54 From the 1880s to 
the 1930s, Muslim subjects of the Ottoman bey of Tunis actively sought 
fiscal and other advantages for themselves by switching between 
“European,” (Muslim/Jewish) “ lgerian,” or (Muslim/Jewish) “Tunisian” 
personal legal status.55 The lines between different religious categories 
were indeed fixed in French colonial and international private law, but in 
practice the persons subject to those categories managed to manipulate 
them in response to the ebbs and flows of European (French, Italian, and 
British) and indigenous competition for control over both territory and, 
especially, the costs and benefits of imperial administration.56 By the time 
of the maturation of the independence movement in postwar Tunisia, 
however, that ability to play off of the rigid boundaries of the colonial law 
of persons came to an end.57 In colonial Algeria, by comparison, it is 
doubtful whether that ability ever existed in the first place, such was the 
rigidity of the boundaries separating the Abrahamic faith communities from 
 
 51. Id. at 31–35. The Senatus-Consulte effectively drew a distinction between nationality and 
citizen: the Muslim Algerian would become a French national, but not a citizen so long as he continued 
to follow Muslim law. Only by renouncing Muslim law would he be admitted to the rights of a French 
citizen. For at least a few years following the 1865 Senatus-Consulte, until the Crémieux decree of 
1870, the same distinction between nationality and citizenship was also drawn with respect to Algerian 
Jews. 
 52. See, e.g., LEWIS, supra note 42, at 37 (describing the “dual justice system”). For a detailed 
study of the Muslim law courts in French Algeria, see generally ALLAN CHRISTELOW, MUSLIM LAW 
COURTS AND THE FRENCH COLONIAL STATE IN ALGERIA (1985). 
 53. See LEWIS, supra note 42, at 1. 
 54. Id. at 28–31. 
 55. Id. at 1–13. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 165–77. 
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one another. 
The culmination of these trajectories is reflected in the 1957 treaty 
with Tunisia and the Evian Accords. Tunisia, which achieved independence 
from France in 1956, agreed in a 1958 judicial accord that “in matters of 
personal status . . . persons of French nationality are [to be] governed by 
their national law.”58 At Evian, similarly, the FLN agreed that “personal 
status, including the inheritance regime, of French ressortissants will be 
governed by French law.”59 (The very next provision of the so-called 
Declaration of Guarantees provided that Algerian law would eventually 
determine what “civil and political rights” would apply to French nationals 
remaining on Algerian territory following independence.)60 
V 
In contrast to these agreements, as we have seen, the symmetrical 
treaties involve “protections” for both French and non-French nationals—
“protection” being used in quotation marks because the very notion that 
one needs to be shielded from the national law of another nation is itself a 
highly fraught concept that is difficult to untangle from the colonial 
histories involved. And therein lies one of the difficulties with the May 29, 
2013 circular: it treats as timeless and neutral legal principles a set of 
provisions that may well differ radically as between their original intent or 
effect and their contemporary application and meaning.61 Note, first of all, 
that the agreements in question all predate the emergence of legalized 
same-sex marriage in Europe and elsewhere. The very notion of using these 
decolonization agreements as mechanisms for regulating “postmodern” 
conflicts of law involving gay marriage is therefore questionable. 
A related difficulty is that the empire/migration distinction that seems 
to have produced the two categories of treaties at issue—asymmetrical and 
symmetrical—has long since broken down. Since the 1960s, indeed to 
some extent already during the colonial period, the migration flows have 
 
 58. Loi 58-86 du 1 février 1958 portant publication de la convention judiciaire entre le France et 
la Tunisie signée le 9 mars 1957 [Law 58-86 of February 1, 1958 adopting the declaration of the 
judicial agreement between France and Tunisia signed March 9, 1957] JOURNAL OFFICIAL DE LA 
REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Feb. 2, 1958, p. 248, art. 2. 
 59. Evian Accords, supra note 49, Déclaration des garanties [Declaration of Guarantees], Part 
III, art. 6. 
 60. Id. art. 7. 
 61. CIRCULAR OF MAY 29, 2013, supra note 18, at *4–5. 
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gone in the opposite direction: from the former colonies to the former 
metropole rather than the other way around. Thus, rules originally designed 
to shield a preexisting, extraterritorial French heterosexual marriage 
regime—one that sought, above all, to protect French women from 
polygamous Muslim legal relationships, whether during the colonial era or 
under postindependence, Muslim North African governments—are now 
used to deny North African immigrants to France equal participation in the 
legalization of same-sex marriage.
62
 The result is a disjuncture between 
original context of the treaties and their contemporary instrumentalization. 
By definition, the space opened up by that disjuncture cannot adequately be 
accounted for by either empire or immigration as analytical and historical 
frameworks. We must therefore have recourse to some additional set of 
considerations. 
Religion and religious difference provide the missing link, which is 
nonetheless supplemental and related to, rather than exclusive of, the 
histories of empire and immigration. The key to this interpretation involves 
recognizing that the May 29, 2013 circular of the Ministry of Justice is 
doing far more legal work than simply reiterating longstanding principles 
of private international law (principles that, in any case, are themselves the 
product of a long history of French legal reasoning). Two dynamics seem 
to be at work. One, already mentioned, involves the perpetuation of a 
French colonial tradition of differential personal legal regimes based on a 
combination of religion and “nationality.”63 The treaties thus protect 
French (read, Christian and heterosexual) nationals living in predominantly 
Muslim nations that just so happen also to be former French territories (in 
this sense, French law is still operating extraterritorially). 
Second, and I think even more saliently, the new conflicts rules invoke 
decolonization-era agreements in order to legitimate a purportedly binding 
form of deference to the governments of predominantly Muslim nations. 
Those nations also just so happen to be former French territories that, in the 
years since independence, have seen large numbers of formerly colonial 
subjects emigrate to the former metropole. The domestic legal hostility to 
same-sex marriage and indeed homosexuality in general in these nations—
symbolized by a partly mythological image of what “Muslim” law 
 
 62. The restrictions reflected in the Circular reflect an additional arbitrariness stemming from 
decolonization.  t the time of independence,  lgerians were permitted to elect either “ lgerian” or 
“French” citizenship. Those who happened to elect “ lgerian” citizenship have now become subject to 
the limitations announced in the Circular. On the choice between French and Algerian citizenship at 
independence, see SHEPARD, supra note 50, at 139–68. 
 63. See supra notes 50–59 and accompanying text. 
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represents—then becomes the rationale for giving “Muslim” law 
extraterritorial force, so as to prevent an Algerian man, for example, from 
entering into a same-sex marriage with a French national in France.64 
What we have here, in other words, is a kind of contemporary Muslim 
exemption from the French legalization of same-sex marriage. It is not an 
exclusively Muslim accommodation, since the treaties in question also 
implicate Polish nations and the Indochinese nations (the former Yugoslav 
republics, by contrast, have long included large Muslim populations). But 
the prominence of France’s postcolonial, ongoing relations with North 
Africa is such that it is hard to describe the Muslim dimension of the new 
conflicts rules as simply one variation on a larger, more abstract, more 
secular theme. Indeed, it may well be that the legalization of same-sex 
marriage has paradoxically revealed—at the level of contemporary 
international relations—the limitations of laïcité (secularism) as the 
operative norm of theory of French marriage law. The apparent “Muslim 
exemption” from same-sex marriage suggests that there is still a religious 
subtext to the institution of mariage pour tous (as same-sex marriage is 
known in France). It is the subtext that pertains to marriage tout court, the 
lingering sacramental content of marriage itself. 
VI 
This paradox is hardly unique to France. American law has long since 
purported to treat marriage as an essentially secular, civil institution 
regulated by state(s) rather than church.65 Yet the persistent opposition to 
same-sex marriage in the United States seems inexplicable except in 
relation to religious belief, just as the various state constitutional and 
statutory bans on gay marriage amount, in effect, to establishments of 
religion.66 Equality and due process principles, rather than 
nonestablishment, have nonetheless assumed a position front and center in 
the current legal battle over same-sex-marriage.67 
 
 64. The erection of administrative obstacles to “mixed” or “binational” marriages between 
persons of French and North African descent has a long history in France. See Hymenal Politics, supra 
note 33, at 543 (noting the role of “religious and racial phobias” in “colonial-era discussions of 
marriages between  uropeans and  orth  fricans”). 
 65. NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 5–6 (2000). 
 66. See id. at 6 (noting that the “Christian religious background of marriage was unquestionably 
present and prominent” even in the modern regime of secular state control of marriage). 
 67. This is true not only of the American proceedings but was also true of French litigation in the 
years before legalization. An ultimately unsuccessful 2010 challenge to the constitutionality of the 
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Before returning to the American comparison, it is worth pointing out 
two further potential complications in the French legal landscape that I 
have outlined here. First, it may be that, since May 2013, we can and 
should read the new conflicts rules in France as designed to protect (there is 
that word again) same-sex French couples living in territories that forbid 
gay marriage. Once again, Muslim North Africa stands out in this regard, 
given the longstanding French expatriate presence there. It is far from clear, 
however, that this is how the French government today is seeking to use the 
various treaties specified in the Ministry of Justice circulate. For one, the 
Ministry of Justice has not explained exactly how or why it is invoking the 
international conventions at issue, whether symmetrical or asymmetrical.68 
We are simply meant to understand that France is somehow “bound” by 
them in the precise way the circular envisions (even though some of the 
agreements themselves permit France to renounce them on grounds of 
repugnance to fundamental norms).69 
Second, it is worth reiterating that the treaties were concluded prior to 
the rise of same-sex marriage. Third, the number of gay North Africans 
seeking refuge in France is almost certainly far greater than the number of 
gay French citizens living in North Africa. For these reasons, it seems 
doubtful that Justice Minister Christiane Taubira is primarily concerned 
with the protection of French same-sex nationals abroad. Certainly it is just 
as likely that the May 29, 2013 circular was designed to avoid agitating the 
French government’s relations with  orth  frican immigrant communities 
in France, whose views on homosexuality probably tend to overlap to a 
significant decree with those of French social conservatives. 
Even assuming that this is the modus operandi of the May 29, 2013 
circular, it gives rise to the following contradiction: in order to protect 
some same-sex couples from discrimination at the hands of foreign 
governments, it is necessary to discriminate against others at the hands of 
 
former marriage provisions of the Civil Code relied on equality and fundamental right to marry 
theories. Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2010-92 QPC, Jan. 28, 2011, 
J.O. (Fr.). 
 68. The only statement by a Ministry spokesperson that I have been able to track down suggests, 
generically, that French enforcement of the treaty provisions is necessary in order to protect French 
nationals living overseas. See Marie Piquemal, Un couple gay franco-marocain obtient le droit de se 
marier, LIBERATION (Oct. 22, 2013), http://www.liberation.fr/societe/2013/10/22/un-couple-gay-
franco-marocain-obtient-le-droit-de-se-marier_941458. 
 69. On the economic risks of renouncing these treaties, particular those related to decolonization, 
see the analysis of Mathias Audit as quoted in Stéphanie Trouillard, Le mariage pour tous en France, 
mais pas pour tous les étrangers, FEANCE24.COM, (June 27, 2013), 
http://www.france24.com/fr/20130626-mariage-tous-circulaire-exception-pays-etrangers-convention-
homosexuels-gay. 
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their own government. How? By forcing on those others the choice 
between Algerian (or Tunisian, Cambodian, Laotian, etc.) citizenship 
without same-sex marriage and French citizenship with it. The upshot is a 
catch-22 that perpetuates the stark, either-or violence of identity and legal 
status that has been a consistent thread through the eras of empire, 
decolonization, and postcolonialism: you are either with us, or you are with 
them—and, if you are gay, you may well belong, as in this context, to 
neither.70 
Meanwhile, thanks in part to the efforts of French human rights 
collectives such as l’ARDHIS and Les Amoureux au Ban Public, the 
French judicial system has begun to point towards a way out of the 
dilemma.71 In October 2013, the appeals court of Chambéry, in the Savoy 
region of southwestern France, ruled on the legality of the new conflicts 
rules in a case involving the attempted marriage of a French national and 
his Moroccan partner.72 Denying the couple a marriage license violates the 
principles of “French public international order,” the court ruled, citing 
decisions of the Court of Cassation (France’s highest court for civil and 
criminal matters) that upheld the “eviction” of bilateral treaties in such 
 
 70. Joseph Massad’s important study Islam in Liberalism appeared as this article was going 
through the production process. Massad traces the recent rise of a missionary form of Western gay 
rights imperialism that condemns Muslim societies for their intolerance of gays and lesbians. JOSEPH A. 
MASSAD, ISLAM IN LIBERALISM 213-274 (2015).   do not see Massad’s analysis clearly reflected in the 
French legal provisions discussed here (which Massad does not reference); those provisions purport to 
refrain from imposing a universalist vision of same-sex rights on the rest of the world, albeit only where 
certain binational treaties are concerned. Again, however, that all-important qualification suggests that 
Massad is at least partly right, for he also argues that the new sexual citizenship policies of Western 
Europe presuppose a binary set of heterosexual and homosexual identities that Muslim societies are at 
once commanded to institutionalize and deemed incapable of tolerating. The effect is to exclude persons 
associated with those societies from the benefits of the new sexual citizenship precisely because of their 
“native” countries’ presumed political and cultural hostility to Western norms of sexual emancipation. 
Id. at 216–17, 268–69. See also Hymenal Politics, supra note 33, at 555 (“The postulation of a 
regressive and traditional Islam as a distinct social problem provides a powerful way to name an 
otherwise diffuse menace. Once Islam is designated as a specific (sexual) threat, legal mechanisms can 
be used to bound and contain it.”). 
 71.  ’ R H   advocates for the rights of  GBT immigrants and asylees in France. See ARDHIS, 
http://www.ardhis.org (last visited Jan. 24, 2015). Les Amoureux au Ban Public, whose name is a pun 
on a song by the famous French singer-songwriter Georges Brassens, has as its mission to advocate for 
the rights of “mixed” (French-foreign) couples in France. See LES AMOUREUX AU BAN PUBLIC, 
http://www.amoureuxauban.net (last visited Jan. 24, 2015). 
 72. Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Chambéry, 3ème ch., Oct. 22, 2013, RG 
13/02258 (Fr.), available at http://www.impatriation-au-quotidien.com/images/10-textes-de-
lois/jurisprudences/cour-dappel/ca_2013/ca_2013-10-22_n13-02258_chambery.pdf. 
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situations.73 The Chambéry court found especially troubling the anomaly 
that permits the national of a country where same-sex marriage is barred to 
marry a French national of the same sex so long as first spouse happened 
not to hail from a former French territory.
74
 Such an arbitrary disparity 
amounts to a form of discrimination based on sex or nationality and 
introduced an “inequality of all before the law.”75 The court concluded, 
therefore that the personal status provision of France’s symmetrical 1981 
treaty with Morocco had to be set aside.76 
Its peculiar terminology notwithstanding, the doctrine permitting 
“eviction” of a treaty that violates “French public international order” is a 
frequently invoked principle of French private international law, an 
essentially judge-made body of law that includes cases concerning the 
interstate recognition of marriages. The doctrine comes in both plenary and 
attenuated versions, depending on whether the marriage in question was 
contracted in France or overseas (the stronger, plenary version is reserved 
for marriages formalized in France). But it has rarely been used to discard a 
provision of treaty law posing an obstacle to marriage; instead, French 
courts have used the doctrine most often to annul polygamous and 
incestuous marriages contracted in France.77 Indeed, a leading French 
treatise on private international law concludes straightforwardly, without 
referencing the contrary Chambéry decision, that to discard the national 
law of a foreign, same-sex marriage applicant on the grounds of its 
incompatibility with public international order amounts to a repeal of new 
conflicts rules of the Civil Code.78 
On January 28, 2015, the Cour de Cassation upheld the Chambéry 
 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. For further commentary on this decision, see Gaëtan Escudey, Le mariage homosexuel et 
le « nouvel ordre public international » : un surprenant changement de paradigme! A propos de l’arrêt 
de la Cour d’appel de Chambéry du 22 octobre 2013, REVUE DES DROITS ET LIBERTÉS 
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(discussing the conflict between Muslim personal status codes and French law and the challenges posed 
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appeals court decision, albeit on terms that do not fully resolve the 
underlying constitutional issue. Following the lead of the couple’s 
attorneys, the Cour de Cassation effectively hoisted the 1981 French-
Moroccan treaty by its own petard. Notwithstanding the personal status 
provision of that symmetrical treaty, another article of the very same treaty 
(article 4) provided that the law of either party to the treaty could be 
“discarded” if “manifestly incompatible with public order.”  nd since the 
new regime of marriage equality is now part of that public order, the 
marriage must be allowed.79 In so ruling, the Cour de Cassation relied on a 
kind of “internal” norm of public order: internal, that is, to the treaty itself, 
and hence by definition not repugnant to it – as opposed to an norm of 
international legal interpretation that could control a treaty regardless of 
that treaty’s content. 
It is too early to tell whether this solution to the underlying 
constitutional norm was too clever by half. In a communiqué attached to 
the decision, the Cour de Cassation made clear that its ruling had only a 
limited application. Although describing the right to marry as a 
“fundamental right,” the court observed that same-sex marriage is 
recognized only by a minority of nations. And it stated that a personal 
status provision incorporated into a treaty like the 1981 French-Moroccan 
accord could be discarded only if the “foreign” spouse had an “attachment” 
to France, which the petitioner in this case had by virtue of his residency in 
France. Alternatively, the treaty provision can be discarded so long as 
same-sex marriage in the other contracting state is not “universally 
rejected,” even if it is not authorized.80 
Perhaps this is what equality sounds like in this context, given the 
current state of French law and politics.  Certainly it is a victory for the 
plaintiffs in this particular case.  But the court’s reliance on “pure [treaty] 
law,” as the opinion put it,81 suggests that some further maneuvering may 
be ahead. In the meantime, to judge from the growing literature on the 
 
 79. Cour de Cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., Jan. 28, 2015, Bull. 
Civ. I, No. 96 (Fr.), available at 
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 80. Cour de Cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., Jan. 28, 2015, Bull. 
Civ. I, No. 96 (Fr.), Communiqué relatif à l’arrêt dit du (Fr.), available at 
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Civ. I, No. 96 (Fr.), available at 
https://www.courdecassation.fr/jurisprudence_2/premiere_chambre_civile_568/96_28_30981.html. 
GHACHEM_ACCOMMODATING EMPIRE [DRAFT] 88 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) 
2015] ACCOMODATING EMPIRE 123 
relationship between private international law and international human 
rights law, it appears that governmental efforts to enlist bilateral treaty law 
so as to oppose or limit reforms aimed at introducing greater social and 
political equality are increasingly common in France and other European 
Union member states, notwithstanding countervailing principles of the 
European Convention on Human Rights.82 
VII 
That (gay) marriage and the family find themselves at the center of 
these conflicts and debates over the definition and jurisdiction of the nation 
should not, by itself, come as a surprise. Bruno Perreau’s work on the 
adoption of children by same-sex parents in France has revealed the 
centrality of sexuality and filiation to the institutions and ideologies of 
citizenship.83 To some extent, what I have written here about gay marriage, 
empire, and immigration follows in these footsteps. Like adoption, 
marriage law inevitably implicates questions of jurisdiction, competence, 
and conflict of laws. People adopt children across national boundaries, and 
they marry across boundaries too. Governments must decide what rules to 
apply to such familial legal transactions, and the rules they end up choosing 
disclose a great deal about how both domestic and international law 
construct model forms of parent, spouse, and child. 
What is striking about the new conflicts rules in France is the extent to 
which they also seem to construct a model form of the “immigrant.” For 
not all boundary crossers are equal under these rules, as we have seen. 
Moreover, the link between France’s history as an imperial nation and its 
contemporary demographic diversity is such that immigration is never, as it 
can sometimes seem in the United States, an abstract experience. In 
America, the ideology of the melting pot implies that all immigrants are 
 
 82. On this theme, see Horatia Muir Watt, Les modèles familiaux à l’épreuve de la 
mondialisation (aspects de droit international privé), 45 ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT 271, 271 
(2001); Horatia Muir Watt, Concurrence ou confluence? Droit international privé et droits 
fondamentaux dans la gouvernance globale, 27 REVUE INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT ECONOMIQUE 59, 59 
(2013); 2 BUREAU & MUIR WATT, supra note 34, at 119–123; MYRIAM HUNTER-HENIN, POUR UNE 
REDEFINITION DU STATUT PERSONNEL 454–74 (2004). Hunter-Henin’s work is particularly useful for its 
analysis of the distinct methods by which fundamental rights can affect questions of personal status in 
international private law. 
 83. BRUNO PERREAU, THE POLITICS OF ADOPTION: GENDER AND THE MAKING OF FRENCH 
CITIZENSHIP xi–xiv (Deke Dusinberre trans., 2014). See also Fassin, supra note 4, at 230-232 
(comparing the rhetoric of marriage and filiation). See generally Eric Fassin, National Identities and 
Transnational Intimacies: Sexual Democracy and the Politics of Immigration in Europe, 22 PUB. 
CULTURE 507 (2010) (discussing the relationship between sexuality and national identity in the context 
of the idea “sexual democracy”). 
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capable of shedding their pasts and attaching themselves to the abstract 
embodiment of citizenship that is defined by the nation’s founding 
documents (I emphasize the word “seem” here because it is not my claim 
that this ideology has ever captured the actual experience of immigrants to 
the United States). The republican model of citizenship in France embodies 
a similar kind of abstract, assimilationist commitment to the nation—
particularly as compared to the territorial principle of citizenship that 
figures in German law.84 In practice, however, the republican model has 
repeatedly shown the particular traces of France’s postcolonial condition, 
most notably the role of Muslim North African immigration, in shaping 
definitions of what it means to be French.85 
The headscarf controversy is the classic case in point,86 and Perreau’s 
work suggests a link between that debate and the ones over male-female 
parity and the reform of kinship law. In all three cases, he argues, French 
law embodies a “quest for anthropological justifications for the nation’s 
political projects,” such that the “citizen’s gendered body is considered to 
be the very site from which the social body draws its identity.”87 It 
therefore stands to reason that the recent and ongoing debates over the 
reform of marriage law partake of these same dynamics. It remains striking 
just how explicitly France’s postcolonial condition has inserted itself into 
the legalization of gay marriage, and just how prominent seems the role of 
religion and religious exemption in that context. 
VIII 
Although the message here is critical of French public policy at the 
intersection of gay marriage, empire, and immigration, it remains the case 
that, as of this writing, France, not the United States, has legalized gay 
marriage as a matter of national law. And though American federalism is 
surely part of that explanation, by now it is clear that the law of American 
 
 84. ROGERS BRUBAKER, CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONHOOD IN FRANCE AND GERMANY 3–6 (1992). 
 85. Id. at 138–164; Nicolas Bancel et al., Introduction. La fracture coloniale: une crise 
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arising from French nationalism and immigration of Muslims from former French colonies). For a very 
different take on the headscarf controversy that deemphasizes the postcolonial context, see generally 
Peter Baehr & Daniel Gordan, From the Headscarf to the Burqa: The Role of Social Theorists in 
Shaping Laws Against the Veil, 42 ECON. & SOC’Y 249 (2013). 
 87. PERREAU, supra note 83, at xii. 
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federalism does not preclude a decision striking down the existing barriers 
to gay marriage in some fourteen states (as of mid-February 2015).88 There 
may be something to be said for centralization in the aftermath of empire, 
in other words. 
Moreover, although the United States does not seem to face a conflict 
of laws issue at the level of international relations as France does, it does 
face a version of this issue at the level of domestic (state-to-state) law, as 
the litigation over the DOMA makes clear. What happens, for example, 
when a citizen of Massachusetts, which permits same-sex marriage, wishes 
to marry a citizen and resident of the state of Texas, which does not? One 
possibility is for the Texas resident to become a Massachusetts resident—
that would be the “French” solution in this context. But state residency 
rules are more flexible than national citizenship laws, and few if any of the 
thirty-six states that currently permit same-sex marriage89 actually require 
residency as a condition of marriage under its laws (in contrast to the rules 
for divorce in these states, which do require residency). Justice Scalia’s 
dissenting opinion in Windsor points out that, in the aftermath of DOMA’s 
invalidation, it is not clear how the federal government should treat a 
validly contracted, out-of-state, same-sex marriage of two persons who 
reside in a jurisdiction that does not permit same-sex marriage—a 
phenomenon that is anything but marginal given the right that Americans 
of whatever sexual persuasion or marital status enjoy to live in whatever 
state of the union they wish.90 Windsor itself did not involve this situation, 
because (although the plaintiffs were married in Ontario, Canada) the state 
of New York had legalized gay marriage before Windsor’s claim was 
finally adjudicated.91 
Another open question is whether a prohibitionist state must itself 
recognize a same-sex marriage validly contracted elsewhere. Under current 
statutory law (section two of DOMA), the prohibitionist states are 
expressly relieved of such an obligation, but that provision has been 
challenged since Windsor.92 Apparently, given that section three of DOMA 
 
 88. See supra text accompanying note 21. 
 89. See supra text accompanying note 21. 
 90. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2708 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting). This freedom 
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Law and Politics of Internal Migration in Twentieth-Century America 3-6 (Apr. 24, 2013) (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University) (on file with Southern California Law Review) (emphasizing the 
period from the 1930s to the 1970s as one of gradual transition to a regime of progressively freer 
internal movement). 
 91. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2682–83. 
 92. See Baude, supra note 36, at 151, 158–60. A Supreme Court decision striking down state 
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is now declared invalid, Justice Scalia’s preferred solution would be to 
keep these matters out of the hands of the federal government, as different 
states continue to permit or deny same-sex marriage depending on the 
results of local political processes.93 That seems untenable, both as a matter 
of choice of law rules and given where Justice Kennedy seems to be headed 
on the gay marriage question. 
The Supreme Court will resolve these questions by June 2015.94 The 
likely result is a situation in which the United States faces neither an 
international nor a domestic version of the conflict of laws problem: in 
other words, an even more uniform and centralized standard for marriage 
law than is the case in France today. That likelihood, in turn, leads to the 
final irony of this comparative exercise. The United States, which has never 
had a national law of marriage or any other form of domestic relations law, 
will likely soon have a nationwide standard for determining the substantive 
conditions of marriage. And that standard will (if and when adopted) 
impose an even greater degree of homogeneity, both outside and inside the 
nation’s borders, than does the regime of the Code Civil. 
The drama of the battle over gay marriage is beginning to subside, as 
even opponents of a national right to same-sex marriage begin to 
acknowledge that such an outcome is at hand.95 There is a kind of justice in 
that sense of anticlimax. Barring an unexpected adverse opinion by a 
conservative majority, the final edict will be eloquent and stirring—but it 
will not be heroic. The heroes and heroines of this fight are not Supreme 
Court justices: they are lawyers like Mary Bonauto,96 and the many gay 
and lesbian citizens whose courage and determination have made us a 
better and more humane nation than we once were. I believe this to be true 
in part because I myself have learned to become a better person (or so I 
would like to think) thanks to what this controversy has taught me about 
the meaning of difference and sameness in the matter of human sexuality 
and love. And there is more to learn. But, as one looks out to the horizon in 
February 2015, the drama and the struggle over equal marriage in the 
United States now seem to belong to the past. 
 
bans on gay marriage would moot this issue, among several others. 
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 94. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
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What, then, will remain of the story told in this essay after the new 
constitutional settlement has been formalized by further judicial and 
legislative elaboration? One set of questions worth pondering—whether 
age or antipolygamy restrictions on marriage ought to be handled any 
differently (under either constitutional or international private law) than 
restrictions based on the sexual orientation of the spouses—takes us 
beyond the scope of this essay.97 Two more immediate and directly related 
concerns come to mind. The first is that there are many kinds of foreigners 
in American law, and the same-sex marriage debate has exposed how the 
different kinds of “foreignness” in America intersect with, rely on, 
reinforce, and also undermine one another.98 The meaning of statehood 
itself, construed as the power to draw lines both between and within 
different communities of people, is, fittingly, the final ontological and legal 
front in the battle over gay marriage. One possible reverberation of 
marriage equality is that, here as in France, it will bring greater awareness 
of the multiple and overlapping constructions of the stranger that both 
nations have, collectively, produced. 
Perhaps that conclusion strikes too hopeful a note. Even if it is not too 
hopeful, one might reasonably ask how exactly it might turn out to be the 
case. That challenge suggests a second and more concrete repercussion of 
marriage equality, one that centers on the relationship between LGBT 
activism and the movement to regularize the status of illegal aliens. 
Interviewed recently on the PBS program “Finding Your Roots,”99 the 
playwright Tony Kushner observed that “[w]hen it came time to understand 
how to be gay in a homophobic world, I already knew the model to follow 
because I knew how to be Jewish in an anti-Semitic world.”100 Something 
like this intersectional (to use the now familiar term of critical race theory) 
experience and understanding of discrimination writ large seems to be at 
work in the recent “coming out” of illegal aliens.101 The very existence of 
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the so-called DREAMer movement, led by and on behalf of undocumented 
youth, is itself a remarkable development of contemporary American 
history.102 Its creative adaptation of the experience of antigay 
discrimination is another. Rose Cuison Villazor has shown in a recent 
article that, particularly among undocumented immigrants who came to the 
United States as young children, the gay and lesbian “coming out” 
narrative has proven to be an especially powerful precedent and 
inspiration.103 
In turn, the choice to identify publicly as undocumented immigrants, 
despite the risk of deportation, has already become an undeniable force in 
the ongoing debate over immigration reform.104 There is no inherent 
impulse towards an ever-expanding circle of inclusion in American law. 
But the transsubstantive character of constitutional law means that the 
rights of one group of persons can never be entirely separated from those of 
another. If the movement for same-sex marriage concludes by transferring 
even some of its moral and ideological energy to the cause of immigration 
justice, it will have served a doubly heroic role. 
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